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From 1964, when it was first granted by the Tanzanian government to OAU recognized 
liberation movements, Kongwa camp has been a key site in southern Africa’s exile 
history. First SWAPO and FRELIMO, and later the ANC, MPLA and ZAPU, inhabited 
neighbouring sites near the town of Kongwa in central Tanzania, where they trained 
their respective members in guerrilla tactics and prepared to infiltrate their countries of 
origin. Despite the importance of Kongwa for any history of southern Africa’s liberation 
struggles, few secondary sources draw attention to Kongwa as a lived space, and none 
consider it beyond the historiography of a particular national movement. In contrast, 
this essay highlights the experiences of Namibians living in an international community 
at Kongwa during the 1960s. Drawing on taped interviews, published memoirs, the 
ANC’s Morogoro Papers, and Tanzanian historiography and ethnography, it argues 
that Kongwa shaped a social hierarchy among exiled Namibians determined by their 
differing abilities to form relationships with non-Namibians around the camp. The 
essay traces the formation of this hierarchy through histories of how Kongwa camp 
formed; of how Namibians related to Tanzanian officials, other liberation movement 
members, and local farmers there; and of how such relationships shaped the form and 
resolution of conflicts within SWAPO. I emphasize that these histories are obscured by 
southern Africa’s national historiographies and that they demand a regional approach 
to exile which attends to the particular sites and kinds of spaces in which exiles lived.1 
Kongwa has been a key site in southern Africa’s exile history since 1964, when it 
was granted by the Tanzanian government to liberation movements recognized 
by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The South West Africa People’s 
Organization (SWAPO) and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) – 
and later the African National Congress (ANC), the People’s Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and 
other movements – first inhabited neighbouring camps near the town of Kongwa 
in central Tanzania, where they trained their respective members in guerrilla tactics 
and prepared to infiltrate their countries of origin. Some people passed through 
Kongwa only briefly as they moved between training courses and combat zones, 
1  This article draws from research conducted with the support of the University of the Western Cape’s Centre for Humanities 
Research and presented at ‘Camps, Liberation Movements, Politics’, a conference which I convened at UWC in August 2011. 
Parts of the article also draw from my doctoral dissertation, ’Exile History: An Ethnography of the SWAPO Camps and the 
Namibian Nation’ (University of Michigan, 2009), where I discuss Kongwa through the experiences of one of the camp’s former 
inhabitants (222-239). I am grateful to all who contributed to this research, including research participants (whose names appear 
in the citations) and colleagues. Of these colleagues, I would especially like to acknowledge Sifiso Ndlovu and Paolo Israel who 
introduced me to several of the archival sources discussed below.
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but many also lived at Kongwa for years as they awaited instructions from their 
commanders and sought other opportunities abroad. There, southern Africa’s 
liberation movements, several of which are now ruling parties, governed their own 
citizens for the first time. And these nations in waiting were shaped by Kongwa’s 
unique international community, consisting of local agro-pastoralists, Tanzanian 
officials, southern African exiles, and the far-flung governments and organizations 
which supported and influenced them. 
 Such qualities of Kongwa’s camps – of the camp as an international, lived space 
– are barely reflected in historical literature. Most often, sources mention Kongwa 
as part of the history of one liberation movement’s armed struggle. For example, 
Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO’s former Secretary of Information and a professional 
historian, writes in his book, A History of Resistance in Namibia, that SWAPO ran 
‘operational headquarters in Tanzania’ from which it coordinated its ‘fighting units’ 
in Namibia and where ‘the fighters were brought together ... to harmonise and agree 
upon final operational procedures’.2 There is no reference to the particular place 
where this camp is located, nor to the years when Namibians and people of other 
nationalities lived together there. Other authors associate Kongwa with moments of 
conflict within a liberation movement. Thus, in Namibian historiography, Kongwa 
has been invoked as a crisis (‘the Kongwa Crisis’) in which seven guerrillas (‘the 
Seven Comrades’ or ‘Chinamen’) based at Kongwa in 1968 openly criticized the 
SWAPO leadership and were detained by the Tanzanian authorities.3 While making 
important contributions to historical knowledge, these and other texts consistently 
frame Kongwa as part of a nation’s history and reduce the sites where exiles lived to 
‘events’, ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’ in narrow nationalist narratives.4 
 In contrast, this article describes the international relations of daily life at 
SWAPO’s Kongwa camp and relates this life to tensions which developed among 
Namibians there during the 1960s. I argue that SWAPO officials responsible for 
fellow nationals at Kongwa used their privileged access to representatives of other 
nations around the camp to manage conflicts emerging within it. This perspective 
is obscured in histories of ‘the Kongwa Crisis’, which focus on the role of a few 
individuals in a national liberation struggle rather than on the international relations 
which enabled elites to speak on a nation’s behalf. Nevertheless, this perspective 
may be developed through the oral testimonies of Namibians who lived at Kongwa 
and the archives and historiographies of different nations, which extend these 
testimonies beyond their national frames. By drawing attention to Kongwa as an 
international, lived space, the article provides insight into social contexts in 1960s 
Tanzania with far reaching consequences for post-colonial Namibia. It illuminates 
people whose experiences in the past, and grievances in the present, have been 
2 Peter Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1988), 60, 85. Histories of other liberation 
movements refer to Kongwa in very similar ways. See, for example, Vladimir Shubin, ANC: A View from Moscow (Johannesburg: 
Jacana, 1999), 50. 
3 Lauren Dobell, Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means (Basel: P.Schlettwein Publishing, 1991), 37-38; 
Colin Leys and John S. Saul, eds., Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword (London: James Currey, 1995), 43-44; 
Justine Hunter, Die Politik der Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia: Umgang mit Schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen der 
Ära des Bewaffneten Befreiungskampfes, 1966 bis 1989 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2008), 77-80; Paul Trewhela, Inside Quatro: 
Uncovering the Exile History of the ANC and SWAPO (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2009), 143, 189. Trewhela’s work was previously 
published in 1990 in the journal Searchlight South Africa. 
4 Among this literature, Sifiso Ndolvu’s work is unique because it includes a substantial discussion of daily life at Kongwa. See 
Sifiso Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’ in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1 (1960-1970) (Cape Town: 
Zebra Press, 2004), 411-478. Nevertheless, it and the interviews from which it draws focus squarely on the ANC camp, offering 
little attention to those who lived alongside South Africans at Kongwa. See The Road to Democracy: South Africans Telling Their 
Stories (Houghton: Mutloatse Arts Heritage Trust, 2008).
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effaced by histories of exile in southern Africa. And it suggests what is at stake in 
writing histories which focus on Kongwa and the other camps where southern 
African exiles lived.
 
Living at Kongwa: A New International Community
On 25 May 1963, the Organization of African Unity was formed in Addis Ababa. 
Among the groups established under the auspices of the OAU was the Co-ordinating 
Committee for the Liberation of Africa, which soon became known as the ‘OAU 
Liberation Committee’. Tasked to decolonize the territories in Africa which 
remained under colonial rule, the Liberation Committee was made responsible for 
coordinating aid given to liberation movements and for managing a liberation fund. 
Importantly, the Liberation Committee’s headquarters were to be based in Dar es 
Salaam. There it would be close to those southern Africa nations whose liberation 
movements were opposing colonial and apartheid regimes and would receive 
support from the Tanzanian (then Tanganyikan) government, led by Julius Nyerere.5
 By the mid-1960s the number of southern African exiles in Tanzania was 
growing quickly. Some of these early exiles were political activists who had recently 
established offices in Dar es Salaam for their liberation movements or were seeking 
recognition from the Tanzanian government. Increasingly, however, there were other 
southern Africans entering Tanzania and Dar es Salaam. In the case of SWAPO, 
the majority of exiles who entered Tanzania during the early 1960s were contract 
workers recruited in Francistown, Bechuanaland.6 In 1962 and 1963 SWAPO 
transferred some of these exiles from Tanzania to Egypt, the USSR and China where 
they participated in military training courses alongside exiles from other liberation 
movements.7 Other exiles enrolled in schools, above all Kurasini International 
Educational Centre, a secondary school established by the African-American 
Institute in Dar es Salaam to prepare southern Africans for tertiary studies.8 Still 
others found themselves without any occupation or place to stay and moved into 
overcrowded refugee camps administered by humanitarian organizations on the 
outskirts of the city.9 
 It is in this context that the Tanzanian government, on behalf of the Liberation 
Committee, set aside a tract of land in central Tanzania for the liberation 
5 Klaas van Walraven, Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa, 1963-1993 (Aldershot, 
England: Ashgate, African Studies Centre Research Series, No. 13, 1999), 238. 
6 In the Namibian literature only Tony Emmet draws attention to the importance of SWAPO’s Francistown office for recruiting 
most of the early Namibian exiles. See Tony Emmett, Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-1966 
(Basel: P. Schlettwein Publishing, 1999), 331-332. All of my research participants who lived in exile during the 1960s emphasized 
the importance of the Francistown office. See, for example, Interviews with Samson Ndeikwila, 21 July 2007, 28; Nambinga 
Kati,11 August 2007, 7-8; Helao Shityuwete,14 December 2010. Page numbers accompanying interviews refer to transcripts 
which I have donated to the National Archives of Namibia and to the Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western Cape.
7 Interview with John Otto Nankudhu and Helao Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 1; Sam Nujoma, Where Others Wavered (London: Panaf 
Books, 2001), 158-159; Susan Brown, ‘Diplomacy by Other Means: SWAPO’s Liberation War’ in Colin Leys and John S. Saul, eds. 
Namibia’s Liberation Struggle, 20; Leonard Philemon ‘Castro’ Nangolo, My History (1994), 2. In Where Others Wavered, SWAPO 
President Sam Nujoma refers also to Algeria, Ghana and North Korea as places where SWAPO members received military 
training by 1963, but John Otto Nankudhu and Helao Shityuwete, two of the first guerrillas trained by SWAPO, maintain that 
Namibians accessed military training in Algeria, Ghana and North Korea only later.
8 Kurasini opened its doors in December 1962 and became a full-fledged secondary school in 1965. By January 1967, 188 students 
were enrolled there, including 150 ‘refugee students’ from Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa 
(ANC Morogoro Office, Box 11, Folder 96, ‘Kurasini International Education Centre’, 2-3).
9 See, for example, Interviews with Silas Shikongo, 26 July 2007, 13-15; Kaufilwa Nepelilo, 3 August 2007, 6. One source suggests 
that the growing numbers of southern African exiles living on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam may have been seen by the 
Tanzanian authorities as a security risk – especially after the January 1964 coup attempt against Nyerere’s government (Interview 
with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 18). 
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movements. The land was situated at the site of an abandoned school and railway 
station located less than two kilometres west of Kongwa village and eighty kilometres 
east of Dodoma.10 According to Samora Machel, he and other FRELIMO cadres 
arrived at Kongwa and began to construct the camp on 4 April 1964.11 Similarly, John 
Otto Nankudhu, one of the first group of SWAPO guerrillas to inhabit Kongwa,12 
indicates that he and his Namibian comrades arrived at the site around April 1964 
and, within two days, were joined by a larger group of Mozambicans led by Samora 
Machel.13 Over the next several weeks, SWAPO and FRELIMO members renovated 
the dilapidated school building into soldiers’ barracks, constructed new buildings 
to be used as offices and kitchens, and separated the two movements’ camps with a 
barbed wire fence.14 In all these activities, the liberation movements were aided by 
local Tanzanians who, at the request of Tanzanian government officials, helped with 
the camps’ construction and provided food and drink for the workers.15 By May the 
Namibians and Mozambicans had moved out of their tents, which they had pitched 
in the bush near Kongwa, and into their respective camps.16
 From the perspective of its first inhabitants and many others, the site allocated 
to the liberation movements at Kongwa17 must have appeared a periphery. It was 
situated far from the borders of Tanzania and of exiles’ countries of origin. It was 
also located nearly 500 kilometres from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s main urban 
centre as well as the centre of the liberation movements’ respective communities 
in exile. Driving the rough, gravel road between Dar es Salaam and Kongwa was a 
full day’s journey,18 and although there was a railway stop located fifteen kilometres 
northeast of the camp along the line running inland from Dar es Salaam to Lake 
Tanganyika, the liberation movements’ access to the railway was restricted by the 
Tanzanian government.19 The territory surrounding Kongwa was sparsely populated. 
The village of Kongwa was inhabited by no more than 1000 people.20 Around it 
lay farmland and small, shifting settlements occupied by people who collectively 
referred to themselves as ‘Wagogo’.21 Through a combination of agriculture, cattle-
10 Interviews with Nankudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011; Helao Shityuwete,14 December 2010; 17 December 2010; Toivo 
Ashipala,16 March 2007, 21; Ndeikwila, 21 July 2007, 22; Ndlovu, ‘ANC in Exile’, 463; ‘Kongwa: Berço da Revolução’, Tempos 
(15 June 1975), 19. Shityuwete maintains that the railway station was built during the German colonial period (Interviews with 
Shityuwete, 14 December 2010; 17 December 2010).
11 ‘Kongwa: Berço da Revolução’, 19. Interestingly, Machel, and the Tempos article in which he is cited, make no reference to 
SWAPO – despite the fact that FRELIMO and SWAPO established the first camps there together. 
12 Interviews with Nankudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 1; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 24; Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, 158-9. 
13 Interview with Nankudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 1-2. It should be noted that in Where Others Wavered, Sam Nujoma 
writes that ‘on 27 May 1963, [SWAPO] opened [its] military camp at Kongwa in Tanzania’. Although it is possible that Nujoma is 
referring to a formal ceremony at which land was allocated by the Tanzanian government to SWAPO, members of SWAPO and 
FRELIMO appear not to have moved to Kongwa until April 1964. 
14 Interview with Nankudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 2, 3-4; Tempos (15 June 1975), 19, 21. Interestingly, there is no reference 
in the Tempos article to the buildings which exiles found on site when they arrived at Kongwa, but Nankudhu is quite detailed in 
his description of the buildings that the liberation movements found at the camp and how they were divided between SWAPO 
and FRELIMO.
15 Interview with Nakudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 4-5.
16 Interview with Nakudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 4-5; Tempos (15 June 1975), 20.
17 Henceforth, I will use ‘Kongwa’ to refer to the site given to the liberation movements outside Kongwa village. If I wish to refer to 
the village or to a particular liberation movement’s camp at Kongwa, I will specify accordingly. 
18 Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010; Lawrence Phokanoka (‘Peter Tladi’) in The Road to Democracy: South Africans 
Telling their Stories (Johannesburg: Mutloatse Arts Heritage Trust), 418.
19 No people or military equipment belonging to the liberation movements could travel via rail due to the threat which such travel 
entailed for the Tanzanian state (Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010). For more detail about how supplies moved to 
and from Kongwa, see the subsection below ‘International Relations and Camp Daily Life’.
20 For estimates of Kongwa’s population during the 1960s, see Interview with Helao Shityuwete,14 December 2010 and Interview 
with Samson Ndeikwila, 21 July 2007, 22.
21 Interviews with Nashilongo, 11 December 2010; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. According to Peter Rigby, an anthropologist 
who conducted fieldwork in the region from 1961 to 1963, Kongwa corresponds to the northeastern region of ‘Ugogo’ (Rigby, 
Cattle and Kinship among the Gogo: A Semi-Pastoral Society in Central Tanzania (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), 12). 
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raising and migration, the Wagogo subsisted in a region prone to extended droughts 
and killing famines.22 During the late 1940s Kongwa briefly became a site in a 
massive British development project known as the ‘East African Groundnut Scheme’ 
and, by the 1960s,23 some Wagogo had entered Tanzania’s migrant labour system and 
were selling groundnuts (karanga) in a cash economy.24 Regardless of the impact of 
these changes on Gogo communities,25 they, and their new neighbours, lived on the 
distant margins of a world system. 
 Nevertheless, they all now lived at the centre of a new international community 
forming around the liberation movements at Kongwa. In the beginning, FRELIMO’s 
was the largest presence in this community. According to Samora Machel, by 
September 1964 Kongwa had already accommodated at least 250 FRELIMO 
guerrillas who, following military training in the camp, infiltrated Mozambique and 
initiated the armed struggle.26 From then until FRELIMO vacated Kongwa in 1966, 
hundreds of FRELIMO guerrillas were moving between the camp and locations in 
Mozambique where they were involved in military operations and supplying those 
living in the liberated zones.27 In contrast, the group of SWAPO guerrillas which 
established Kongwa in April 1964 consisted of only twelve to fifteen individuals.28 
Nevertheless, their numbers did increase rapidly. According to one source, by the 
latter part of 1964 there were roughly 100 Namibians living at Kongwa and, by the 
middle of 1965, there were nearly 300.29 For the most part, these guerrillas remained 
inside the camp with only small groups departing from it to infiltrate Namibia in the 
latter part of 1965 and 1966. 
 Within a year or so of the first camps’ openings, other liberation movements also 
established camps at Kongwa. In August 1964 the ANC founded its camp.30 Located 
on the site of the old railway station about 50 metres outside the SWAPO and 
FRELIMO camps,31 the ANC camp was first inhabited by Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) 
cadres returning from military training in Egypt and the USSR, followed by others 
22 Rigby, Cattle and Kinship, 20; Gregory Maddox, ‘Environment & Population Growth: In Ugogo Central Tanzania’ in Gregory 
Maddox and James L. Giblin, eds., Custodians of the Land (London: James Currey, 1996), 43; Derek Peterson, ‘Morality Plays: 
Marriage, Church Courts, and Colonial Agency in Central Tanganyika, ca. 1876-1928’, The American Historical Review, 111, 4, 
988-990. Maddox emphasizes that the region is the most famine prone region in all of Tanzania with an average annual rainfall 
of about 500 mm per year, just surpassing the minimum for supporting agriculture. 
23 For a discussion of the ‘The Groundnut Scheme’ and its relationship to Kongwa, see Jan S. Hogendorn and K. M. Scott, ‘Very 
Large-Scale Agricultural Projects: The Lessons of the East African Groundnut Scheme’ in Robert I. Rotberg, ed. Imperialism, 
Colonialism, and Hunger: East and Central Africa (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), 167-198. It should further be noted 
that Archie Sibeko, a former ANC commander at Kongwa, suggests that the buildings which the ANC inhabited at Kongwa may 
previously have been used by officials implementing the Groundnut Scheme (Sibeko, Our Lifetime, 81). None of my research 
participants, however, mentioned this connection. 
24 Rigby, Cattle and Kinship, 20, 22, 23; Maddox, ‘Environment & Population Growth’, 54, 56-57.
25 In his text (Cattle and Kinship) Rigby emphasizes that migrant labour and cash crops had minimal impact on ‘Gogo culture’, the 
topic of his study, whereas Maddox’s article (‘Environment & Population Growth’) draws attention to changes in Ugogo over 
time. 
26 ‘Kongwa: Berço da Revolução’, 19-23.
27 ‘Kongwa: Berço da Revolução’, 19-23; Interview with Shityuwete 14 December 2010.
28 Among the original group of Namibians at Kongwa were the following twelve individuals: Tobias Hainyeko, Leonard Philemon 
‘Castro’ Nangolo, John Otto Nankudhu, Titus Muailelpeni Shitilifa, Patrick Israel Iyambo, Peter Hambiya, Lazarus Sakaria, Peter 
‘Shinyafa’ Haitembu, Simeon Linkela Shixungileni, James Hamukuaja Angula, Messah Victory Namuandi and Nelson Kavela 
(Interview with Nankudhu and Shityuwete 2 June 2011, 1; Interview with Shityuwete 24 July 2007, 24). Interestingly, Nankudhu 
and other research participants sometimes refer to ‘the fifteen Namibians’ who originally inhabited Kongwa, but when asked to 
list the names of these original inhabitants, Nankudhu and Shityuwete both identified the same twelve names.
29 Helao Shityuwete, Never Follow the Wolf (London: Kliptown Books, 1990), 99-100; Interview with Shityuwete 24 July 2007, 1-2. 
Shityuwete was responsible for keeping records in the camp office in 1965. 
30 Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, 457; Sibeko, Our Lifetime, 80-81; Isaac Makopo in The Road to Democracy: South Africans 
Telling Their Stories, 210; Tladi, Telling Their Stories, 418. It should be noted that most of these authors give the impression that 
when the ANC entered Kongwa that there were no other liberation movements based there. Only Peter Tladi mentions that 
when the ANC arrived at Kongwa ‘we found that FRELIMO and SWAPO were more or less in the same camp’.
31 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 22; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010; Nankudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 2.
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who had recently travelled from South Africa to Tanzania.32 Numbers increased 
very quickly such that by the end of 1964, there may have been 400 to 500 South 
Africans living in the camp, making it the second largest at Kongwa.33 At least four 
of these first MK cadres at Kongwa were women, contrasting with the SWAPO and 
FRELIMO camps where there appear to have been even fewer women at this time.34 
In 1965 the MPLA and ZAPU also moved to Kongwa.35 There these two liberation 
movements initially located themselves two to three kilometres from the SWAPO, 
FRELIMO and ANC camps.36 Numbers fluctuated considerably in the MPLA camp 
as its leaders prepared to take advantage of Zambian independence in 1964 and 
Zambian government recognition in early 1965 by opening a new front along the 
Zambian-Angolan border.37 Nevertheless, former exiles at Kongwa maintain that 
during the mid-1960s both the MPLA and ZAPU camps remained small relative to 
the camps of FRELIMO, the ANC and SWAPO.38  
 In addition to the liberation movements which were officially inhabiting 
Kongwa,39 there were also others which were not recognized by the OAU that 
were hiding within recognized liberation movements’ camps. For example, in 
1965 and 1966 at least eleven soldiers aligned with Jonas Savimbi and UNITA 
inhabited SWAPO’s Kongwa camp. Savimbi had recruited these soldiers from the 
Angolan community living in the Zambian Copperbelt, and he drew from SWAPO’s 
recognition at the OAU and his close personal relationships with several SWAPO 
and Tanzanian officials to smuggle them into China for training and then back to 
Zambia and Angola.40 UNITA’s ‘Chinese Eleven’ lived among SWAPO members 
at Kongwa for months as the former awaited passage en route to their various 
assignments.41 At the same time, there were others within the SWAPO camp 
who, prior to entering exile, had belonged to the Caprivi African National Union 
(CANU), a liberation movement which claimed to represent Namibia’s Caprivi 
region. Although CANU officially merged with SWAPO in November 1964, some 
Caprivians continued to identify with CANU and recognize CANU leadership 
32 Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, 458-460.
33 Sibeko, Our Lifetime, 82; Interviews with Nashilongo, 11 December 2010; Shityuwete, 14 December 2007.
34 Ruth Mompati discusses the women in the ANC section of Kongwa in The Road to Democracy: South Africans Telling Their 
Stories, 315-316. Only one woman lived in the SWAPO camp during the 1960s, Meme Mukwahepo. She lived in a separate flat 
with her partner, David Shilunga (Interviews with Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 5; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010). Research 
participants maintain that there were no women in the FRELIMO camp (Interviews with Nashilongo, 11 December 2010; 
Shityuwete, 14 December 2010).
35 Interviews with Nankudhu and Shityuwetwe, 2 June 2011, 2; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 21, 22; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010; 
Ashipala, 16 March 2007, 5. It may be that ZANU also administered a camp at Kongwa for a period of time (e.g. Ndlovu, 
‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, 464; Interviews with Helmuth 13 July 2007, 9; 10 August 2007, 11), but I have been unable to 
confirm the timing of ZANU’s arrival or distinguish clearly between the activities of ZAPU and ZANU at Kongwa. Most of my 
(Namibian) research participants refer generally to ‘the Zimbabweans’ at Kongwa. ZAPU is clearly referenced in several of the 
sources which I cite here; ZANU, however, is not. 
36 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 21, 22; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. 
37 Interviews with Samson Ndeikwila, 16 February 2007, 10; Ndeikwila 21 July 2007, 23; Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to 
Africa (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1986), 70. Bridgland specifically refers to a group of ‘170 MPLA recruits’ passing from Zambia 
through Kongwa en route to the Soviet Union in ‘summer 1965’ and ‘another 90’ which passed through the camp en route to 
Cuba. Previously MPLA guerrillas had been working primarily out of a base in Congo-Brazzaville near the border of Cabinda.
38 Interviews with Nashilongo, 11 December 2010; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010.
39 In addition to the previously mentioned liberation movements, the PAC is also occasionally listed among liberation movements 
that once based themselves at Kongwa (e.g. Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, 159), but I have found no specific references to a 
PAC presence at Kongwa in my research, in Ndlovu’s discussion of everyday life at Kongwa, or in Thami ka Plaatjie’s article on 
the PAC in exile, ‘The PAC in Exile’ in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 (1960-1970) (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 
2007).
40 Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 66, 69; Interview with Helmuth, 13 July 2007, 8-10.
41 Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 69-71; Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 21-22; Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 20; Nepelilo, 4 August 
2007, 11-12; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. Shityuwete’s testimony strongly suggests that UNITA’s ‘Chinese Eleven’ not only 
passed through Kongwa for several months in 1966 (as Bridgland narrates), but that they or others affiliated with Savimbi who 
lived in SWAPO’s Kongwa camp in 1965. 
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structures even as they resided within the camp granted to SWAPO.42 Thus, CANU 
too could be counted among the liberation movements based at Kongwa despite 
the fact that the movement and the territory which it claimed to represent were not 
widely accepted. 
The International Relations of Daily Life at SWAPO’s Kongwa Camp
By 1965 then, Kongwa was home to an array of national liberation movements, 
including movements representing all of the southern African nations under white 
minority rule. Ostensibly, each of these movements acted as an autonomous unit, 
governing the daily lives of fellow nationals according to the routines set within its 
camp. In SWAPO’s case,43 the day usually began before dawn when camp inhabitants 
woke to participate in physical training, which included jogging and calisthenics. 
After returning to the barracks and eating breakfast, inhabitants assembled at the 
parade where they participated in the parade ceremony, registered their attendance 
and were assigned tasks for the day. Tasks included routine camp maintenance, such 
as cooking, cleaning and guard duty, as well as other activities more directly aimed 
at training ‘freedom fighters’. For example, inhabitants took classes in which they 
learned how to use different kinds of firearms and explosives, and studied tactics 
and philosophies of guerrilla warfare. Knowledge was tested and skills were honed 
in various ways. Trainees made scheduled visits to the shooting range during which 
they would practice hitting the targets with the different weapons about which they 
had been taught. They also were sent on ‘the long march’ during which they would 
engage in forms of mock warfare, which included laying ambushes for rival groups 
and locating items hidden in the bush.44 During some evenings basic mathematics 
and literacy classes were also held, which, some argued, were critical for guerrillas 
making calculations with explosives and engaging in a freedom struggle.45 Clearly, 
other liberation movements established daily routines similar to those within the 
SWAPO camp.46 But each movement established and administered its routines 
separately from the others.
 In addition to living according to a particular camp’s routines, each camp’s 
inhabitants were highly dependent on the hierarchy of officials administering the 
camp on behalf of a given liberation movement. Thus, in SWAPO’s case, Namibians 
who had previously trained in North Africa or overseas were responsible for those 
arriving at Kongwa from Namibia. These trainers became known in the camp 
generally as ‘the commanders’, and the commanders who founded Kongwa in 
42 For more details about CANU-SWAPO relations at Kongwa see the section of this essay titled ‘The Kongwa Crisis’.
43 In this instance, as in other cases in which I make collective claims about the SWAPO camp in this paper, I draw from all of 
my interviews with inhabitants of this camp during the 1960s. They are: Interviews with Ashipala 16 March 2007, 25 July 2007; 
Sylvester Hangula (pseudonym), 18 June 2011; Helmuth ,13 July 2007, 10 August 2007; Kati, 11 August 2007, 8 December 2007; 
Frederick Matongo,18 June 2011; Nankudhu and Shityuwete 2 June 2011; Nashilongo 11 December 2010; Ndeikwila, 9 February 
2007, 16 February 2007, 2 March 2007, 21 July 2007; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007; 5 June 2008; 14 December 
2010; 17 December 2010; Shikongo, 16 March 2007, 26 July 2007.  
44 Interviews with Ndeikwila, 21 July 2007, 25; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 6. In some instances, the ‘long march’ could last for days 
at a time. For example, Toivo Ashipala indicates that the Mozambicans (but not the Namibians) at Kongwa used to stay in the 
bush over consecutive days, practicing guerrilla warfare techniques (Interview with Ashipala, 16 March 2007, 7). A letter from 
the ANC regional commander at Morogoro on 23 July 1975 also refers to a ‘long march’ scheduled at Kongwa to take place over 
fifteen days for the purpose of practicing ‘a.) Sabotage, b.) Ambush, c.) Raids, d.) Crossing of roads, borders and boundaries, and 
also villages’ (ANC Morogoro Office, Box 26, Folder 17). 
45 Interview swith Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 6; Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 2-3. 
46 See, for example, Ndlovu’s description daily life in the ANC’s camp at Kongwa (‘The ANC in Exile: 1960-1970’, Road to 
Democracy, 463-469) as well as in testimonies recorded in the Telling Their Stories.
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1964 were granted seniority among them.47 Together, the senior commanders and 
SWAPO’s political leaders based in Dar es Salaam granted particular individuals 
further authority over spheres of camp life. Thus, the titles ‘First, Second and Third 
Chief-in-Command’ were conferred on those responsible for the camp and the army 
as a whole, ‘First, Second and Third Secretary’ on those responsible for logistical and 
administrative details in the camp, and ‘Political Commissar’ and ‘Deputy Political 
Commissar’ on those responsible for soldiers’ political education and morale.48 
Together, this hierarchy of commanders distributed food, monitored movement 
and dispersed information among those who lived in the camp. And the hierarchy’s 
jurisdiction over camp and nation was ritually reinforced through camp activities 
– especially during the parade when senior commanders officially set the terms of 
camp life and led inhabitants in drills and songs proclaiming the Namibian nation 
and praising SWAPO and its leaders.49
 Beyond the camp and its national boundaries, exiles at Kongwa were also part 
of an international community, which formed around particular spaces which the 
liberation movements shared. For example, SWAPO and FRELIMO initially shared a 
kitchen which required the two movements to coordinate the preparation and clean-
up of meals.50 SWAPO, FRELIMO and the ANC also shared an armoury which these 
liberation movements were responsible for guarding in joint shifts of two persons 
each.51 Eventually, some of the liberation movements established clinics, which they 
opened to members of other liberation movements and surrounding communities.52 
The shooting range was also a shared space which not only required the organization 
of shifts between the liberation movements, but also the notification of those walking 
on the road to Kongwa village that shooting practice would begin.53 Sometimes 
liberation movements also organized events for which they invited members of 
other movements to visit their camps. For example, there were occasions when one 
movement invited members of another to attend a special parade in its camp, such as 
when someone was scheduled to speak about a topic related to all of the movements’ 
liberation struggles.54 SWAPO, FRELIMO and ANC members also established a 
social committee, which organized events, especially concerts and dramas, which 
were hosted on alternating weeks in the three movements’ offices.55 
 It should be noted that shared use of camp space was not always marked by 
cooperation between nations. For example, the entry of Angolans loyal to Jonas 
Savimbi into SWAPO’s camp in 1965 initiated controversies between SWAPO and 
the OAU recognized liberation movements based at Kongwa.56 According to one 
47 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 7-8; Nashilongo, 11 December 2010.
48 For a detailed discussion of these various positions and their significance at Kongwa in 1965 and 1966, see Interview with 
Shityuwete, 24 July 2007. Peter Tladi also offers an account of how the camp command was organized in the ANC’s Kongwa 
camp. Although the titles and breakdown of responsibilities differ, Tladi emphasizes the importance of hierarchy and titles in the 
camp (Tladi, Road to Democracy, 419).
49 See especially Interview with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 2, 7.
50 Interviews with Nankudhu, 2 June 2011, 4; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 12.
51 Interviews with Shityuwete 24 July 2007, 22; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. 
52 Interview with Shikongo, 26 July 2007, 18; Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, 465.
53 Interview with Shityuwete, 24 February 2007, 6-7.
54 Interview with Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 3.
55 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 22; Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, 464; Makopo, Telling their Stories, 210; 
Interview with Ndeikwila, 17 June 2011.
56 Interviews with: Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 20; Helmuth ,13 July 2007, 8-10; Nashilongo, 11 December 2007; Nepelilo, 4 August 
2010, 11-12; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. See also Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 69-71. There were many 
reasons for the close relationship between SWAPO and UNITA over the next decade, including personal relationships between 
Savimbi, Nujoma and other SWAPO leaders and the strategic significance for SWAPO of co-operating closely with any liberation 
movement working in the parts of Angola through which SWAPO guerrillas infiltrated Namibia.
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SWAPO camp commander, FRELIMO informed the MPLA, which had recently 
arrived at Kongwa and was more distanced from the SWAPO camp, that SWAPO 
was secretly harbouring Savimbi’s men. Thereafter, the MPLA made arrangements 
with FRELIMO to place some of its members in the FRELIMO camp and, from 
there, to spy on SWAPO even as SWAPO became suspicious and began spying on 
the MPLA.57 Controversy erupted again the following year when Savimbi’s men 
returned to the camp from training in China and the MPLA lodged an official 
complaint with the OAU Liberation Committee that SWAPO must hand over the 
Angolans in its camp. SWAPO denied the accusation, apparently on the premise 
that ‘the suspected Angolans’ were, in fact, Namibians, who, like many in the 
camp, had grown up on both sides of the Namibian-Angolan border and therefore 
spoke Portuguese and African languages which crossed the artificial colonial 
boundary. Shortly after the complaint was lodged, SWAPO managed to smuggle the 
Angolans out of Tanzania with its guerrillas entering Zambia. There they reunited 
with Savimibi and entered Angola to become commanders of the newly launched 
liberation movement UNITA.58 
 In addition to relationships forming between the liberation movements within 
their camps, there were also relations forming around Kongwa at the margins of 
the liberation movements’ control. On Sundays and some afternoons and evenings, 
camp commanders permitted rank-in-file soldiers to leave the camps. In these 
instances, and others when camp inhabitants left their camps without permission, 
they usually interfaced with people in the surrounding communities with whom 
they developed diverse relationships. For example, exiles participated in local church 
services.59 They joined and created soccer teams which played in local leagues.60 
They frequented a clinic in Kongwa village before the liberation movements had 
established their own in their respective camps61 and, even thereafter, exiles with 
serious ailments were referred to a local doctor who treated them for free.62 They 
were reliant on the market in Kongwa village for buying and selling commodities, 
although they often had little to bring to these exchanges due to a lack of pocket 
money and basic supplies in the camps.63 It was not uncommon for exiles to barter 
their own clothing for cash, and some created their own gardens near the camps 
primarily so that they could sell their produce in the village.64 Exiles also frequented 
the shebeens in Kongwa location where they drank and socialized with one another 
and local clients.65 
 According to former exile sources, relations between exiles and the communities 
surrounding Kongwa were generally good. Many refer now to ‘the Tanzanians’ or 
‘the Wagogo’ with terms of praise, describing them variously as ‘kind,’ ‘gentle’ and 
‘peaceful’. Clearly, they appreciated commodities, people and institutions which they 
57 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 21; 14 December 2010.
58 Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 70; Interview with Helmuth 13 July 2007, 9-10. In addition to these incidents, referenced widely by 
Namibians living at Kongwa in the mid-1960s, there are other instances of intrigue, spying and conflict between liberation 
movements at Kongwa to which research participants referred, but about which they offered little corroborating detail.
59 Interview with Nashilongo, 11 December 2010.
60 Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, 464; Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010.
61 Interview with Nankudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 2.
62 Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010.
63 Interviews with Kati, 11 August 2007, 1-2; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007. 
64 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 10-11; Ashipala, 16 March 2007, 7.
65 Interviews with: Ashipala 16.3.2007, 7; Ndeikwila, 16 February 2007, 11; Nepelilo, 3 August 2007, 9-10; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 
10; Nashilongo 11 December 2010. According to several research participants, people often bartered clothes for pocket money 
in order to obtain the cash necessary for buying beer at the shebeens.
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could access at Kongwa village and which were not available inside their camps. 
Some suggest that local people appreciated the liberation movements for the supplies 
and knowledge which they brought to the area as well. For example, some Namibians 
note how they surprised and impressed the Tanzanians near Kongwa with their 
farming techniques, which yielded better crops of local staples like maize and beans 
than the locals could produce themselves.66 South African sources refer to an ANC 
farm, which received insecticides and seeds from the OAU, and yielded harvests 
which ‘astounded’ the Tanzanians.67 Similarly, sources maintain that the ANC’s ‘well-
equipped five-bed clinic ... did much to cement relations between the ANC and the 
local population, who preferred the clinic to their own state hospital.’68 Perhaps, it is 
such resources, and their association with a broader, modern world, that led locals to 
refer to the exiles collectively as ‘Wazungu’, or ‘whites.69 
 Regardless of how various Tanzanians around Kongwa saw the exiles who had 
moved into their environs, the former certainly shaped social relations among the 
latter. Importantly, many exiles became proficient in speaking Swahili. For southern 
Africans living at Kongwa, Swahili not only enabled them to communicate with local 
people, but it also became a primary medium through which they communicated 
with one another. Within SWAPO, for example, exiles did not share a common 
language. Although the majority spoke Oshiwambo or closely related languages in 
Namibia’s Kavango region, there was a sizeable minority from the Caprivi region 
who spoke a different set of languages, and while most of the Caprivians spoke 
English, most of the Ovambos did not. In this context, Swahili became the primary 
form of communication across the main ethnic divide among exiled Namibians 
at Kongwa.70 Swahili was also used to communicate across Kongwa’s liberation 
movements whose members had been exposed to different colonial languages to 
different degrees. Thus, Swahili became a means of crossing the linguistic divide 
between the former subjects of British and Portuguese colonialism.71  
 Tanzanians at Kongwa also became a source of, and a medium for, conflicts 
among exiles. Many of the most contentious issues involved sexual relationships 
between exiles, who were almost entirely men, and local women. For example, in 
the SWAPO camp certain commanders were repeatedly accused of spending the 
night in the Kongwa location where they were believed to be sleeping with local 
women.72 Rank-in-file soldiers were also sometimes removed from the camps by the 
commanders due to sexual affairs, such as one instance in which a SWAPO cadre 
impregnated a married woman at Kongwa and was then threatened with violence by 
her husband.73 In another case, a scandal developed in the ANC camp when men in 
the camp ‘formed relationships’ with women who were using the camp’s water supply 
during a period of drought.74 Allegedly, a schism between members of the ANC and 
66 Interview with Nankudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 3. 
67 Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, 463; Isaac Makopo, Telling Their Stories, 211. Isaac Makopo goes so far as to say that ‘the 
Tanzanians could not believe [the ANC farm], because it was the very first of its kind. They didn’t know that people could till that 
arid piece of land’ (Makopo, Telling their Stories, 211). The comment seems to overlook the arid land all around Kongwa which 
local people had been farming for generations, albeit with access to different technology. 
68 Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, 465; Makopo, Telling their Stories, 210.
69 Interviews with Nashilongo, 11 December 2010; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010; Nankudhu and Shityuwete, 2 June 2011, 3.
70 Interview with Ndeikwila, 21 July 2007, 25.
71 Interviews with Ndeikwila, 21 July 2007, 25; Nepelilo 4 August 2007, 3, 11.
72 Shityuwete, Never Follow the Wolf, 99; Interviews with Shityuwete 24 July 2007, 3; 14 December 2010; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 
10. 
73 Interview with Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 23.
74 Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, 468.
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the MPLA during the mid-1960s also began with a fight over women in the Kongwa 
shebeens.75 
 Local women seem to have been a primary source of conflict among exiles at 
Kongwa for several reasons. Certainly, the ratio of men to women around Kongwa 
following the liberation movements’ arrival was highly unequal and was likely to 
cause tension between the movements’ single men and the factions which divided 
them. At the same time, guerrillas were officially discouraged from having sexual 
relationships with local women. As one former exile maintains, ‘it was ... part of 
the training that ... you should not be somebody who likes women... that if you 
were going for war, you should not sleep with a woman.’76 Although a Namibian 
couple was permitted to live together in the SWAPO camp, having ‘wives in the 
location’ was clearly not acceptable, and it appears that none of the liberation 
movements legitimated such relationships or cared for their offspring at this time.77 
Nevertheless, exiles became sexually involved with women at Kongwa, including 
camp commanders, who were in the best position both to move freely outside the 
camp and to discipline others who broke camp rules. Thus, local women became a 
common source of contention between commander and rank-in-file exiles – even as 
the women involved in relationships with exiles remain silent and without agency in 
former exiles’ narratives. 
 Sometimes conflicts over women and other altercations prompted people and 
institutions outside the camps to enter camp space. Of these outside visitors the most 
prominent were Major Shongambele and Lieutenant Muchongo. Based at an office in 
Kongwa village, Shongambele and Muchongo were Tanzanian officials responsible 
for liaising between the liberation movements at Kongwa and the Tanzanian 
government. Although not involved in the camps’ day to day administration, the 
two officers visited the camps regularly and played a crucial role in camp life. 
For example, whenever Tanzanians experienced a problem with members of the 
liberation movements, they were expected to report their problem to Shongambele’s 
office. Working together with the Tanzanian police, Shongambele and his assistant 
would then detain anyone accused of breaking the law and report the incident to 
the relevant liberation movement camp office(s), working with officials there to 
resolve the matter.78 In other cases, exiles requested that Shongambele intervene in 
a conflict within one of the liberation movement’s camps. In the SWAPO camp at 
least, such meetings were usually initiated by the camp commanders and held in 
the camp office, where both commanders and rank-in-file guerrillas would attend.79 
Shongambele could also intervene directly in the liberation movements’ affairs if 
he perceived the interests of the Tanzanian state to be at risk. Such risks ranged 
75 Interview with Ashipala, 16 March 2007, 12.
76 Interview with Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 5.
77 Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. Nevertheless, later at Kongwa the ANC was clearly discussing the organization’s 
responsibility to children which ANC cadres had born with local people. See ‘Meeting of the Region and the Camp Ad. - Kongwa 
8/2/75’ (Morogoro Papers, Box 5, Folder 47). SWAPO also began to discuss children and marriage in its camps during the mid-
1970s after Namibian women began to enter exile in large numbers. 
78 Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. As SWAPO’s Third Secretary-in-Command, Shityuwete participated in many 
such meetings with Shongambele and often visited the Kongwa police station to release SWAPO members who had been 
detained there.
79 My interviews are full of such reported instances some of which I will discuss in the following section of this paper ‘The Kongwe 
Crisis’. See, for example, Interviews with Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 22-23, 27--29; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 20-21, 25-26; Shikongo, 
16 March 2007, 7-8; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 13-14, 23; Kati, 11 August 2007, 6; Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 4; 21 July 2007, 
41-42.
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from the storage and use of weapons at the camps to the bill incurred by liberation 
movements using Tanzanian telephones installed in camp offices.80 
 In addition to Shongambele’s office, other offices were influencing activities 
at Kongwa from further afield. By the mid-1960s, the southern African liberation 
movements were sustained materially through the support of a range of foreign 
governments. These included African states, which from 1963 made annual 
contributions to the OAU Liberation Committee’s fund, which were dispersed to 
the OAU recognized liberation movements and their guerrilla armies.81 Far more 
significant in financial terms were donations made by the Eastern bloc countries, 
especially the Soviet Union, which recognized the liberation movements whose 
armies were based at Kongwa. Soviet aid consisted of cash deposits as well as 
shipments of arms, tinned food and other commodities sent directly from the 
USSR.82 The Chinese government also offered aid to southern African liberation 
movements from the early 1960s although this aid dried up for at least some of 
the movements at Kongwa in 1965 following the Sino-Soviet Split.83 In addition to 
sending material aid, some foreign governments also trained liberation movement 
guerrillas on their own soil. Thus, by the mid-1960s, Kongwa’s inhabitants 
included soldiers who had trained in Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, China and North Korea.84 During their military training courses, 
cadres often participated in political education classes as well. There and in other 
encounters, they were exposed to the ideas of social revolutionaries, such as Marx, 
Lenin, Mao and Castro, and African nationalists, such as Nasser, Nkrumah and 
Nyerere. Although these names were often uttered in liberation movement circles, 
for some exiles at least, training programs run by foreign governments offered a 
more thorough introduction to the ideas of these individuals.85
 Tanzanian and liberation movement officials were key intermediaries in all 
these relations developing between the guerrillas at Kongwa and their supporters 
abroad. With respect to material aid, the Tanzanian government required that items 
intended for the liberation movements be sent to the OAU Liberation Committee’s 
headquarters in Dar es Salaam, ear-marked for a particular movement.86 There, 
aid was separated into the categories ‘military’ and ‘humanitarian’. Military aid was 
to be handled strictly by the Tanzanian government, which transported arms to 
Kongwa by military convoy and handed them over to the liberation movements 
in the presence of Major Shongambele. In contrast, humanitarian aid was given 
directly to the liberation movements in Dar es Salaam, which were then responsible 
for transferring this material to Kongwa themselves. In the case of SWAPO, camp 
commanders sometimes travelled with this aid in SWAPO vehicles. In other 
instances, especially when transporting staples such as maize meal and biscuits 
in bulk, SWAPO sent these items via train and arranged for commanders to pick 
80 Interview with Shityuwete 24 July 2007, 8-10; ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 16, Folder 134, Letter from Eleazar Maboee to ANC 
Deputy President, 15 April 1967. According to the letter, the ANC and ZAPU incurred a bill of ‘about 2200/- ... as compared to 
300/- over the same period for MPLA and SWAPO and FRELIMO’. According to Helao Shityuwete, there were no phones in the 
camps when he worked at the SWAPO office from mid-1965 to February 1966 (Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010).
81 Walraven, Dreams of Power, 243-246; Shubin, ANC, 51-52.
82 Walraven, Dreams of Power, 244-245; Shubin, ANC, 52; Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 9; 17 December 2010. 
83 Shubin, ANC, 52.
84 This list is derived from interviews with Sam Nujoma (4 March 2008), Helao Shityuwete (17 December 2010) and references to 
training sites in SWAPO and ANC literature. 
85 Interviews with Ndeiwkila 9 February 2007, 1, 5; Kati, 4 August 2007, 4; Nashilongo, 11 December 2010; Shityuwete, 17 
December 2010.
86 Shubin, ANC, 76-77.
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them up at the railhead fifteen kilometres from Kongwa. Camp administrations 
established their own systems for recording information about humanitarian goods 
which entered the camps without oversight from Tanzanian officers at Kongwa.87 
 Similarly, liberation movement and Tanzanian officials mediated knowledge 
entering the camps from outside. When cadres returned from their training abroad 
to Kongwa, they brought with them overlapping, but not identical, bodies of 
knowledge about guerrilla warfare and revolutionary struggle. For example, while all 
cadres learned how to drill as part of their training, the counts and steps for drilling 
differed depending on where cadres had been trained. In this and other instances, 
standard practices had to be established for the armies to function effectively.88 
Similarly, ideas about ‘the liberation struggle’ and the nature of the enemy against 
which the liberation movements were struggling was far from identical across 
the countries which trained guerrillas and within the political leaderships of the 
movements themselves. Thus, an institution like Kurasini, the secondary school 
established by the African-American Institute in Dar es Salaam for southern 
African exiles, was identified at Kongwa both as a site which could ‘liberate’ the 
sub-continent and denounced as a threat to the liberation struggle.89 In responding 
to such discrepancies, camp officials frequently used their command of camp 
space, especially the parade, to articulate official knowledge. And they relied upon 
the support of Shongambele and other Tanzanian officials when their authority to 
produce this knowledge was publicly contested. 
 This position – located between southern African nations living in exile and 
the global system of nation-states – granted officials administering Kongwa’s camps 
considerable power. For example, it was rumoured that Tanzanian officials in Dar 
es Salaam were redirecting arms intended for the liberation movements to Biafra, 
Nigeria, where the Tanzanian government supported the secession movement.90 
SWAPO’s leaders in Dar es Salaam were accused of selling clothing intended for 
‘Namibian refugees’ in Tanzania.91 Cash and commodities given by SWAPO leaders 
in Dar es Salaam to camp commanders were often never recorded in SWAPO’s books 
at Kongwa, and rank-in-file soldiers suspected that their commanders were profiting 
from items which were intended for the rank-in-file.92 Camp officials addressed these 
and other controversies in different ways, blaming them variously on ‘South Africa’, 
‘the West’, ‘whites’, and ‘spies’ who had aligned themselves with such foreign agents. 
In so doing, they played to their own position of strength as elites with the power to 
represent a nation. And they obscured how they used this position to wield power 
over those at the margins of the international system living within their camps.
Unraveling ‘The Kongwa Crisis’: Three Camp Histories
When seen from this international perspective, the tensions within SWAPO’s Kongwa 
camp and their resolution appear different than they have in previous historiography. 
To date, published literature and most oral histories which acknowledge SWAPO’s 
87 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 8-10; 17 December 2010.
88 Interviews with Shityuwete, 17 December 2010; Joseph ‘Pereb’ Stephanus and Michael Kahuika, 20 September 2007, 4.
89 Interviews with Ashipala, 16 March 2007, 1; 25 August 2007, 25; Shikongo 26 July 2007, 19-20.
90 Shubin, ANC, 76-77.
91 Interview with Shipanga 20 March.2007, 1.
92 Shityuwete, Never Follow the Wolf, 99; Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 3, 4, 10; Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 23; Nepelilo, 4 
August 2007, 16.
73Living in Exile: Daily Life and International Relations at SWAPO’s Kongwa Camp
internal conflicts during the 1960s refer to Kongwa not primarily as a camp for 
people displaced from a nation but rather as a national crisis. As sources indicate, 
‘the Kongwa Crisis’ occurred following the return of seven guerrillas from military 
training in China in 1968. After spending several months in Tanzania, these seven 
wrote a memorandum, followed by a resignation letter, in which they raised a variety 
of complaints, accusing SWAPO officials of corruption, poor military strategy and, 
in the case of the then SWAPO military commander, Leonard Philemon ‘Castro’ 
Nangoloh, of spying for South Africa. Thereafter, the seven were driven to Dar es 
Salaam and imprisoned, making them among the first of many Namibians to be 
detained by SWAPO officials and front-line state governments over the next two 
decades.93 In their discussion of this episode, scholars do make reference to the 
fact that it occurred at Kongwa, and Colin Leys and John Saul note that among the 
comrades’ grievances were ‘low level of organization’, ‘evidence of tribalism’ and the 
use of ‘preventive detention’ in the SWAPO camp.94 Authors do not consider, however, 
how such issues emerged in Kongwa’s distinct social environment over nearly half a 
decade before ‘the Crisis.’ And they do not account for how the international relations 
in this environment structured the resolution of ‘the Crisis.’ 
 This section turns to these and related issues, unraveling them through three 
camp histories. The first history traces Namibians’ motivations for travelling into 
exile from 1960 to 1966 and their encounters with a reality at Kongwa which often 
differed from their expectations. The second follows the migration into exile of a 
particular group of Namibians under the auspices of the Caprivi African National 
Union (CANU) and how mistrust developed between them and other Namibians as 
they lived together at Kongwa. The third narrates relations between the camp rank-
in-file and ‘Castro’ who, in addition to being the most notorious spy in Namibian 
history, was also the senior camp commander at Kongwa during the mid-1960s. 
Importantly, these histories draw from the overlapping testimonies of people who 
occupied different positions in the SWAPO camp in the past and maintain diverse 
relationships to the Namibian nation, and its ruling party, in the present.95 Together, 
they provide context for understanding how Namibian elites used their position in 
Kongwa’s international community to wield power in consistent and patterned ways.
‘Going Abroad’
 
Well before 1968, SWAPO’s Kongwa camp was a site of discontent for many 
who lived there. To understand this discontent, it is important to consider the 
circumstances in which people found themselves living in the camp. As previously 
noted, the majority of Namibians who entered Tanzania in the early and mid-1960s 
were contract workers recruited in Francistown, Bechuanaland. There SWAPO 
had established an office, under the direction of Maxton Joseph, which aimed 
to recruit workers travelling between northern Namibia and the South African 
93 Dobell, Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 37-38; Leys and Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle, 43-44; Hunter, Die Politik der Erinnerung 
und des Vergessens in Namibia, 77-80; Trewhela, Inside Quatro, 143, 189. In each of these texts, discussion of ‘the Kongwa Crisis’ 
is incorporated into a longer narrative of detentions and human rights abuses committed by SWAPO in exile. 
94 Leys and Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle, 44.
95 Particularly, it should be noted that there are multiple perspectives on Kongwa which extend outside the parameters of the 
national narrative. In addition to working with people who have advanced a counter-narrative of Kongwa through ‘the Kongwa 
Crisis’, I also draw from former camp inhabitants whose experiences have not been included in this counter-narrative and whose 
knowledge of the camp circulates in distinct micro-communities. For further discussion of the social dynamics which shape the 
production of Kongwa’s history see ‘Exile History’, 235-239. 
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Witwatersrand.96 Most of those recruited were passing through Francistown as 
part of the migration route which the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association 
(WENELA) co-ordinated for its mine workers originating outside South Africa.97 
Others were contract workers and students inside Namibia who registered 
with WENELA so that they could make their way to Francistown and join the 
liberation movement in Tanzania from there.98 Apparently, SWAPO officials who 
recruited exiles highlighted opportunities that would be available to Namibians 
who joined the liberation movement ‘abroad.’99 These included the opportunity to 
study internationally, to live in Tanzania and other independent countries, and to 
contribute to Namibia’s liberation from colonial rule.100 By presenting exile in this 
manner, recruiters appealed to a ‘tradition of mobility’ through which southern 
African men had, over generations, found ways to use the migrant labor system to 
access resources and opportunities otherwise denied to them.101 Nevertheless, many 
of these early Namibian exiles, and probably many of the recruiters, had only a vague 
notion of what exiles would actually find in Tanzania. Apparently, some arrived in 
Dar es Salaam optimistic that they would be able to access scholarships regardless 
of their age or the extent of their education prior to travelling abroad. Also, a 
considerable number were unaware of SWAPO’s plans to organize for an armed 
struggle and that they might be enlisted as soldiers in a guerrilla army.102 
 It is, therefore, with surprise and reluctance that some Namibians found 
themselves at Kongwa. For many the encounter began upon their arrival in Dar 
es Salaam when they first met other Namibians living in the city. Among them 
were students at Kurasini who spoke with the newcomers about their impressions 
of life in exile. Apparently, students often discouraged newcomers from going to 
Kongwa and emphasized problems at the camp, such as poor living conditions 
and organization.103 Nevertheless, few Namibians living in Tanzania had a choice 
in the matter. Those who had the necessary educational qualifications, fit within 
the age parameters and had received SWAPO’s endorsement were able to enroll in 
educational institutions in Tanzania.104 The others, who were in the majority and 
who were required to associate with a liberation movement in order to live legally 
96 In the Namibian literature only Tony Emmet draws attention to the importance of SWAPO’s Francistown office for recruiting 
most of the early Namibian exiles (Tony Emmett, Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-1966 (Basel: 
P. Schlettwein Publishing, 1999), 331-332). All of my research participants who lived in exile during the 1960s emphasized the 
importance of the Francistown office. See, for example, Interviews with Samson Ndeikwila, 21 July 2007, 28; Nambinga Kati, 11 
August 2007, 7-8; Helao Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. 
97 WENELA recruited workers from all over southern Africa to work on the mines. Workers were registered in various WENELA 
offices and flown to Francistown from where they were transported by train to the Witwatersrand. The WENELA office in 
Namibia was located in Rundu, and most of those registered at WENELA’s Rundu office were Angolans, transported to Rundu 
from various locations inside Angola. 
98 See, for example, Interviews with Samson Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 2 March 2007, 21 July 2007; Silas Shikongo,16 March 
2007; Kaufilwa Nepelilo,3 August 2007.
99 In my interviews with former exiles, they often used the English word ‘abroad’ or expression ‘going abroad’ regardless of the 
language in which the interview was conducted. See, for example, Interview with Nepelilo, 4 August 2007. 
100 Interviews with Ashipala, 16 March 2007; Hangula, 18 June 2011; Kati, 4 August 2007; Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007; Nepelilo, 4 
August 2007; Shikongo, 16 March 2007;Shityuwete, 24 July 2007. 
101 Emmett, Popular Resistance, 332.
102 Emmett, Popular Resistance, 332; Interviews with Ashipala, 16 March 2007, 3; Hangula, 18 June 2011; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007; 
Shikongo, 16 March 2007.
103 Interviews with Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 5,6; Kati 11 August 2007, 16-17. Interestingly, Nepelilo maintains that Kurasini students 
discouraged him from going to Kongwa even as early as 1964 – well before some of the controversies in the camp. 
104 To enter Kurasini students had to pass an aptitude test, have sufficient English language skills and fit within age parameters, 
which some former exiles remember as eighteen to twenty-five (Interviews with Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 25; Kati, 11 August 2007, 
3; Ndeikwila, 2 March 2007, 3; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 18; Shityuwete, Never Follow the Wolf (London: Kliptown Books, 1990), 
96-97).
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in Tanzania, were sent by SWAPO to Kongwa.105 There, exiles were compelled to 
undergo military training regardless of whether becoming a ‘freedom fighter’ had 
been their intent or if they even supported the SWAPO leadership’s decision to take 
up an armed struggle. 
 Conditions in and around Kongwa further heightened some exiles’ sense of 
discontent. As sources emphasize, life at Kongwa could be harsh. Camp inhabitants 
often lived without basic commodities,106 and their movements and speech were 
monitored and restricted. At the same time, camp inhabitants’ access to resources 
entering the camp from outside was uneven, and the confined living space of the 
camp made such inequalities difficult to hide. For example, rank-in-file soldiers 
made requests for pocket money, but their requests were repeatedly denied – despite 
the fact that commanders who denied them clearly had access to money which they 
were using to purchase items in Kongwa village.107 Similarly, camp commanders 
warned soldiers against drinking excessively and having sexual relationships with 
women even as some repeatedly did not report to the parade and were not found 
in the camp after nights in the location.108 SWAPO’s senior camp commanders at 
Kongwa, it should be further noted, were contract workers with little or no formal 
education just like most of those whom they were commanding in the camp. 
Moreover, most of the rank-in-file soldiers were over thirty years of age and were 
roughly the same age as their commanders.109 In the eyes of some at Kongwa, 
commanders’ authority over the camp was based solely on their having arrived in 
exile first and received positions by the SWAPO leaders – not on their legitimacy to 
govern those inhabiting the camp.110 
 Especially troubling for some newcomers at Kongwa were instances in which 
camp commanders dismissed SWAPO leaders who encouraged Namibians to study. 
For example, in 1964 SWAPO Secretary General Jacob Kuhangua visited Kongwa 
and informed the Namibians there about opportunities to study at Kurasini which 
might soon become available to the camp’s younger inhabitants, regardless of 
their previous education.111 Those who passed their studies at Kurasini, Kuhangua 
stressed, could receive scholarships to study in the United States of America. 
Apparently, Kuhangua’s words were received by some camp inhabitants with great 
enthusiasm, but commanders took to referring to Kuhangua and the Kurasini 
students as ‘stooges’ set on undermining the Namibian revolution.112 While 
discussion of the ideological differences among the SWAPO leadership took place 
away from the camp parade ground, it was clear to many that their aspirations 
to study had become entangled in Cold War divisions which aligned the camp 
commanders with the Soviet bloc and against Kuhangua and some other SWAPO 
leaders.113
105 This point is confirmed by all of my Kongwa research participants as well as Tony Emmett. As he writes, ‘It was essentially 
those for whom scholarships could not be obtained who formed the nucleus of the SWAPO guerrilla force’ (Emmett, Popular 
Resistance, 332). And this guerrilla force was based at Kongwa.
106 See, for example, Interviews with Kati , 11 August 2007, 1-2; Shikongo, 22 July 2007, 19.
107 Interview with Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 16.
108 Interviews with Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 5; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 3; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 10.
109 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 18; Kati, 11 August 2007, 1.
110 See, for example, Interview with Nepelilo,4 August 2007, 7, 9. 
111 Interviews with Ashipala, 16 March 2007, 1, 25 July 2007, 25; Shikongo, 22 July 2007, 19-20.
112 Interviews with Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 25; Hangula, 18 June 2011. 
113 For a discussion of Cold War divisions within the SWAPO leadership and how they appeared to different people at the camp, see 
Interviews with Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 25; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 15-16; Hangula, 18 June 2011. 
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  It is in this international context, at once local and global, that some of the 
first Namibians began to resist the camp order and confront officials at Kongwa. 
Among these early dissidents was Silas Shikongo. Like others attending St. Mary’s 
Mission School in Odibo during the early 1960s, Shikongo was recruited by Peter 
Nanyemba, then SWAPO’s Representative for East Africa, to leave Namibia to seek 
further studies through the liberation movement in exile. By 1964 Shikongo was 
living in a camp for southern African refugees on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam 
where he waited for SWAPO to arrange a scholarship for him. Sometime thereafter, 
possibly in response to the Tanzanian government’s efforts to reduce the number of 
liberation movement members living around Dar es Salaam,114 Shikongo was sent 
by SWAPO to Kongwa. As Shikongo emphasizes, SWAPO took him and about fifty 
other Namibians from the refugee camp at night without any prior notice that they 
were to be sent to Kongwa.115 In response, Shikongo attempted to address camp 
officials in the hope that he, like some other young Namibians, would be permitted 
to leave the camp and further his studies. Repeatedly, however, he found his efforts 
thwarted. To account for his misfortune, Shikongo explains that after arriving at 
Kongwa, Tobias Hainyeko, the commander of the camp and of the South West 
African Liberation Army (SWALA), learned that Shikongo descended from a royal 
family that was closely associated with the South African government and its efforts 
to establish apartheid homelands in Namibia.116 Hainyeko was, therefore, unwilling 
to support Shikongo’s search for scholarships or allow him audience with SWAPO 
officials in Dar es Salaam on the premise that if he were granted a scholarship that 
he might ‘just fly from there ... to see [his] father’.117 Shikongo, in turn, attempted 
to subvert the camp command by smuggling a letter to SWAPO President Sam 
Nujoma, who originates from a village neighboring Shikongo’s in the Ongandjera 
region of Ovamboland and knew Shikongo personally. Nujoma eventually did come 
to the camp to announce that those who were interested in taking up further studies 
should register their names. But the response from the political leadership was slow 
and, according to Shikongo, he and others tired of waiting and began to express their 
discontent in new ways.118
 Towards the end of 1965, Silas Shikongo decided to stop taking orders from the 
camp commanders: ‘I must not go to cook; I must not go for the morning marching 
or morning [parade]; I must not go to the camp gate at nighttime.’119 Although 
Shikongo emphasizes that his ‘strike’ was a personal choice and lasted for about three 
months,120 there were also clearly others who were not following the camp rules at 
this time, and some who had fled the camp at night and not returned.121 In response, 
114 According to Helao Shityuwete (Interview, 24 July 2007, 18) and Vladimir Shubin (ANC: A View from Moscow, 54), from 1964 
the Tanzanian government limited the number of liberation movement members in Dar es Salaam to registered students and 
four or five representatives administering movement offices. All others had to be sent elsewhere. Shityuwete suggests that the 
impetus for this regulation was the January 1964 coup attempt against Nyerere’s government.  
115 Interviews with Shikongo, 16 March 2007, 4; 22 July 2007, 14.
116 Shikongo’s father was a chief in Ongandjera and his father’s youngest brother, Ushona Shiimi, became the first Chief Councillor 
of the Ovamboland Homeland from 1968-1972. 
117 Interview with Shikongo, 22 July 2007, 5.
118 Eventually, SWAPO did send a group of twenty Namibians, who had registered to study during Nujoma’s visit at Kongwa, to 
Mbeya. There they were administered a test. Those who passed were sent to Kurasini to study while those who failed were 
sent back to Kongwa or detained at Keko Prison (Interviews with Shikongo, 22 July 2007, 21; Nashilongo, 11 December 2010; 
Hangula 18 June 2011). For a personal account of how the SWAPO leadership handled those who failed the test at Mbeya, see 
Interview with Hangula, 18.6.2011. 
119 Interview with Shikongo, 22 July 2007, 7.
120 Interviews with Silas Shikongo, 6 June 2011, 8 June 2011.
121 Interview with Shikgongo, 22 July 2007, 18-19; most of my Kongwa research participant who lived in the camp in 1966 discuss 
these events. Shikongo narrates them in relationship to his own strike (Interview with Shikongo, 22 July 2007, 7, 18-19).
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Tobias Hainyeko and Major Shongambele decided to call a meeting of all Namibians 
at Kongwa in the SWAPO camp office in January 1966.122 There, Shongambele asked 
those assembled to explain the situation in the camp and express their concerns. 
Shikongo was among three rank-in-file soldiers who spoke and explained that their 
purpose for entering exile was to study, that they had been taken to Kongwa against 
their will, and that they felt they were being mistreated in the camp.123 Related issues 
were also introduced such as Hainyeko’s alleged prejudice against Shikongo, and 
Shikongo’s work in the camp logistics office, from where he had distributed fresh 
milk and other items to those who claimed dietary needs that were not recognized by 
the commanders.124 In making these statements at the meeting, Shikongo appealed 
to Shongambele to intervene in injustices at the camp or at least to bring them to the 
attention of other SWAPO officials, such as Peter Nanyemba and Jacob Kuhangua 
whom many aspiring students saw as allies but who remained distant from Kongwa 
at SWAPO’s Dar es Salaam offices. Instead, Tanzanian officials escorted Shikongo 
and his two outspoken comrades the same night to Dar es Salaam’s Keko Prison 
where they spent the next six months in detention.125  
 Shikongo was among the first Namibians to be detained for openly criticizing 
camp officials at Kongwa,126 but multiple confrontations and detentions followed in 
the camp over the next five years. Setbacks in Namibia’s liberation struggle are clearly 
an important context for understanding many of these incidents. Although the first 
group of SWALA guerrillas (G1) managed to infiltrate Namibia from Kongwa in 
1965, the second group (G2) was arrested by the South African Police in Namibia’s 
Kavango Region in May 1966.127 Thereafter, several groups which entered Namibia 
were captured128 and, following the first skirmish between SWALA and the South 
African Police at Ongulumbashe on 26 August 1966, South Africa arrested thirty-
seven leading SWAPO members, who were then tried under the Terrorism Act 
of 1967. These developments brought SWAPO’s efforts to infiltrate guerrillas into 
Namibia and to recruit more Namibians for its liberation army to a standstill. By the 
late 1960s SWAPO’s Kongwa camp had become an outpost for trained Namibians 
who were not actively involved in an armed struggle, and many began to avoid camp 
activities and fled from the camp.129 The Seven Comrades were among those who 
challenged the status quo at Kongwa at this time, differentiating themselves from 
others by confronting SWAPO’s camp leadership and Shongambele’s office with a 
written memorandum aimed at addressing the problems in the camp.   
 Nevertheless, it is easy to overlook the fact that tensions between the rank-
in-file and commanders at SWAPO’s Kongwa camp preceded SWAPO’s military 
collapse and shaped the Seven Comrades’ memorandum. From as early as 1964, 
some Namibians living at Kongwa were dissatisfied with their placement at a camp 
that constrained their access to opportunities which they had hoped to find in exile. 
Increasingly, they resented the commanders who were responsible for monitoring 
122 Interviews with Shikongo, 16 March 2007, 7; 22 July 2007, 18.
123 The other speakers were Lazarus Pohamba and Valendin Katumbe. 
124 Inverview with Shikongo, 22 July 2007, 18.
125 Interview with Shikongo, 22 July 2007, 8.
126 Interviews with Shikgongo, 16 March 2007, 22 July 2007; Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 31; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 15.
127 Katjavivi, A History of Resistance, 59-60; Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, 159-162, 170-171; Shityuwete, Never Follow the Wolf, 
101-130.
128 The arrest of subsequent groups is confirmed by former Kongwa inhabitants interviews and by Sam Nujoma (Where Others 
Wavered, 172-173).
129 It appears that order at Kongwa dissolved in 1967. See, for example, Interview with Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 33-35.
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their lives inside the camp and who were better able to access a world outside of it. 
When Shikongo and others resisted their place in the camp order by disobeying rules 
and appealing to Major Shongambele, they again discovered the vulnerability of their 
position – beholden to a Tanzanian official mediating relations between an exiled 
liberation movement and the government which supported it. Only later, when rank-
in-file Namibians managed to forge their own social networks with people outside 
the camp, were some able to access the study opportunities which had enticed many 
of them to travel ‘abroad’. As one former camp inhabitant recalls, during the mid-
1960s Jackson Kambode, a SWAPO official living in Dar es Salaam, left the liberation 
movement and travelled to Nairobi where he began to study with a scholarship 
accessed through the United Nations. Eventually, word of Kambode’s scholarship 
reached Kongwa and the first Namibians there began to make their way to Kenya.130 
To encourage their comrades to join them and facilitate their travel, Namibia’s first 
Kenya exiles corresponded with those still at Kongwa through a Tanzanian whom 
they had befriended in Kongwa village and who helped smuggle letters in and 
out of the camp on their behalves.131 By the early 1970s there were more than fifty 
Namibians living in Nairobi.132 Most of them had once lived at Kongwa, including 
Silas Shikongo who, following his release from Keko Prison, eventually made his way 
to Kenya and secured a scholarship.133 
 
Caprivi African National Union (CANU) 
In addition to those whom SWAPO officials recruited to join the liberation 
movement in Tanzania during the 1960s, some Namibians travelled abroad under 
the auspices of other organizations. Among these organizations was CANU. 
Founded by school teachers in Namibia’s Caprivi Region in September 1962, 
CANU managed to mobilize support among a range of teachers, students and 
traditional leaders in the Caprivi over the next two years.134 Following a student 
strike at Catholic Mission School in Katima Mulilo and the arrest of CANU 
President Brendan Simbwaye in 1964, as many as seventy CANU members fled 
across the Zambezi River into Zambia.135 Several months later, in Lusaka, leaders 
from CANU and SWAPO agreed to merge the two organizations and Brendan 
Simbwaye and Mishake Muyongo were appointed SWAPO Vice President and 
SWAPO Representative to Zambia, respectively.136 In December 1964 and January 
1965 SWAPO made arrangements to transport the exiled Caprivians, most of whom 
130 Interview with Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 35.
131 Interview with Ashipala. 25 July 2006, 35.
132 For more details on the Namibian exile community in Kenya, see Interviews with Ashipala, 16 March 2007, 1-2, 25 July 2007, 
35; Ndeikwila, 21 July 2007, 38-40, 13 May 2011. It should be noted that Namibians at Kongwa also migrated from Tanzania to 
other countries including Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia (Interviews with Ashipala, 16 March 2007, 2; Kati 11 August 2007, 12, 
15; Ndeikwila, 2 September 2007,13 May 2011). 
133 Shikongo was released from Keko Prison in July 1966. After learning that SWAPO might send him again to Kongwa, he made 
his way to Mbeya where he passed an examination, qualifying him to attend Kurasini. In 1970 Shikongo moved on to Nairobi, 
where he joined other Namibians already studying there (Interviews with Shikongo, 16 March 2007, 10-11, 8 June 2011). 
134 Albert Zechariah Ndopu, Interview with Beauty Matongo, 27 February 2011, 7-13. Ndopu’s detailed narrative of the formation 
of CANU corrects Peter Katjavivi’s assertion that CANU was established in 1963 (A History of Resistance in Namibia, 51).
135 Interview with Ndopu, 27 February 2011, 9-13; Frederick Matongo, Interview with Beauty Matongo, 13 March 2011, 19-20; 
Interviews with Frederick Matongo, 18 June 2011, 1-2; Ellen Musialela, 24 July 2008; Samson Ndeikwila,2 March 2007, 13, 15. 
As Matongo, one of the students involved in the strike, indicates, people crossed into Zambia in small groups, and many of the 
students arrived there before Simbwaye’s arrest in July 1964.
136 Interview with Ndopu, 27 February 2011, 13-15; Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia, 51. By the time of the official 
merger Simbwaye had been detained by South African Security Forces. He is believed to have died in detention. During the 
1970s Muyongo became the Acting Vice President of SWAPO before he was expelled from the organization in 1980. 
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had congregated in refugee camps in southwestern Zambia and had not participated 
in the negotiations which merged CANU with SWAPO, to Tanzania.137 There, in 
the southwestern Tanzanian town of Mbeya, the Caprivians were divided into two 
groups, with a smaller group sent to Dar es Salaam for further schooling and a larger 
group sent to Kongwa for military training.138   
 The arrival of the Caprivians at Kongwa changed the social dynamics within 
SWAPO’s camp significantly. The great majority of the 100 to 200 Namibians who 
had previously inhabited Kongwa were Oshiwambo speakers from north-central 
Namibia and others who shared similar languages and cultural practices from 
Namibia’s Kavango Region.139 Thus, upon their arrival in the camp, the Caprivians 
became a large ethnic minority. Not only did the newcomers speak languages 
which were unintelligible to those previously residing in the camp, but they shared 
relatively little common history with their new neighbours. Although they lived 
within the same colonial boundaries, Caprivians had not been incorporated into the 
German and South African colonial economies through the contract labour system 
as had people from the Ovambo and Kavango Regions, and many had schooled 
and worked in southwestern Zambia alongside Zambians with whom they shared 
overlapping pasts and cultural affinities. Moreover, the idea of creating CANU had 
been generated not through exchanges with Namibian nationalists, but rather with 
Zambian nationalists – particularly the United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
whose leaders Caprivians met regularly during the early 1960s and on whose model 
CANU drafted its constitution.140 Moreover, the social backgrounds of the particular 
groups from Caprivi and Ovambo/Kavango sent to Kongwa differed considerably. 
Many of the Caprivians had been educated in mission schools and spoke English 
whereas most others in the camp, including the established camp commanders, did 
not.141 Thus, initially, the Caprivians shared no common language with their new 
neighbours, and they were accommodated in separate tents, further reinforcing the 
sense that the camp was composed of two distinct ethnic/political groups.142 
 It is in this context that a conflict began to unfold between ‘CANU’ and ‘SWAPO’ 
at Kongwa.143 According to Frederick Matongo, one of the first cohort of Caprivian 
exiles, tensions emerged just before their arrival at the camp when a SWAPO 
representative came to collect Caprivians assigned to Kongwa at the Dodoma train 
station: 
137 Interviews with Ndopu, 27 February 2011, 13-15; F. Matongo, 13 March 2011, 19-20, 18 June 2011, 3-4. Moreover, Ndopu, who 
during the early 1960s was CANU’s Public Secretary, maintains that the CANU delegation sent to Lusaka in July 1964 was not 
sent by the exiled CANU leadership to meet with SWAPO. Rather, their mission was to update members of the United National 
Independence Party and the United Nations on developments in the Caprivi. He and other members of the CANU leadership 
waiting in the camp for the delegation’s return were, therefore, ‘amazed’ and ‘irritated’ when they learned that SWAPO and 
CANU had merged (Interview with Ndopu 27 February 2011, 14). 
138 Interviews with Ndopu, 27 February 2011, 15; F. Matongo 13 March 2011, 20, 18 June 2011, 2.
139 Helao Shityuwete, Never Follow the Wolf, 99-100; Interview with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 1-2. In addition, camp inhabitants 
included a few Otjiherero speakers who had been recruited from the Herero community in Bechuanaland and from sometime 
in the middle of 1965 the Angolans recruited by Jonas Savimbi.
140 Interview with Ndopu, 27 February 2011.
141 Interviews with F. Matongo, 13 March 2011, 20; 18 June 2011, 2; Ndeikwila, 2 March 2007, 15; Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. 
It should be noted that some Oshiwambo speaking camp inhabitants had been educated at mission schools (such as St. Mary’s 
in Odibo) where English was the medium of instruction, but the vast majority, including most of the camp commanders, had 
accessed little or no formal education.
142 Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010. In 1965 rank-in-file guerrillas at Kongwa were accommodated in tents, with 
concrete structures reserved for the commanders (Interview with Hangula, 18 June 2011). By 1967 all the Namibians at Kongwa 
were accommodated in concrete barracks although the barracks of the Caprivians and other Namibians at Kongwa remained 
separate (Interviews with Ndeikwila, 2 March 2007, 19; 21 July 2007, 25; 17 June 2011). 
143 As noted, CANU did not officially exist as a separate organization from SWAPO in 1965. Nevertheless, the terms ‘CANU’ and 
‘SWAPO,’ and the related ethnic/regional labels ‘Caprivian’ and ‘Ovambo,’ were used by those involved in the conflict.
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When we hear[d] the name Kongwa, we were puzzled because at that time 
there was a war ... in Congo Kinshasa ... For us the two names ‘Kongwa’ and 
‘Congo’ [sounded] the same ... [Before] that time in our lives we had never 
before [been] mixed with other Namibians such as Ovambo[s] ... We could 
not speak Oshiwambo and Afrikaans; the Ovambos could not speak Subia 
and English ... The people who came to collect us arrived in the morning 
but we were just refusing to go until at around 4 [pm]. Then Green[well 
Matongo]144 said, ‘Let’s just go. Once we reach the border we shall see words 
on the board, telling us that we are now entering this country... If we see it is 
Congo, we shall not cross the border.’145 
 Eventually Matongo’s group arrived at Kongwa (not Congo) and took up training 
in the camp, but their relationship with their Oshiwambo speaking commanders 
continued to be dogged by language divides and related issues. Sources suggest 
that the SWAPO commanders did little to make the newcomers from Caprivi feel 
welcome in the camp and that some of the Caprivians questioned the credentials 
of their new commanders, whom they thought, as representatives of a nationalist 
movement, should be able to speak English.146 Commanders, on the other hand, 
seem to have mistrusted the intentions of some Caprivian leaders, whom they 
suspected were not committed to SWAPO but had only merged with SWAPO so 
that they could resurrect CANU in Tanzania.147 For some months these tensions 
remained outside Kongwa’s public discourse, but events in the middle of 1965 
brought them to the surface. According to some accounts, Mishake Muyongo 
travelled from his office to Kongwa where he organized a special meeting with other 
Caprivians, hatching his plans to revive CANU and sowing the seeds for an open 
rebellion.148 Camp minutes, while not dismissing Muyongo’s role as instigator, offer 
another narrative, grounded in the circumstances of camp daily life.149 As Titus 
Muailelpeni, one of the commanders, narrates: ‘One night some of [the Caprivian] 
comrades arrived from the village under liquor influence, [sic] they were insulting, 
swearing, cursing and saying all bad languages ... [about] the SWAPO leaders.’ In 
response, some of the camp commanders threatened to fight the Caprivians. As one 
Caprivian reports, a commander ‘came … in our tent with a stick in his hand [with] 
the intention to do harm to us’.150 
144 Greenwell Matongo, nephew to Frederick Matongo, later became the Chief Political Commissar of the People’s Liberation Army 
of Namibia and one of the best known SWAPO guerrilla commanders. He died in 1979 when his car drove over a land-mine. 
145 Interview with Matongo, 13 March 2011, 20.
146 Interviews with Ndeikwila, 13 May 2011; F. Matongo, 13 March 2011, 20-21; 18 June 2011, 2. It should be noted that, in Matongo’s 
account, the language barrier between Caprivians and Ovambos became less divisive after the Caprivians spent time with their 
new comrades in the camp. In contrast, Ndeikwila and several other former Kongwa inhabitants maintain that language was an 
on-going source of division among Namibians at Kongwa. 
147 Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010.
148 Interviews with F. Matongo, 18 June 2011, 4; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 13. 
149 University of Namibia, Katjavivi Collection, Series B1, Category 5, File No. 9, ‘The National Executive Committee of SWAPO 
held 21/9/65 at 8.10 A.M. Under the Chairmanship of Leonard Philemon First D.D.C Chief Under Secretary of Josep Shitwete’, 
[henceforth ‘Minutes 21/9/65’], 5-6. It should be noted that these minutes are the only ones available from Kongwa in the 
Katjavivi Collection or any of the other major archives of SWAPO material which I have been able to access. According to Helao 
Shityuwete, who took the minutes himself, he was one of the first literate commanders at Kongwa and initiated the practice of 
keeping camp minutes after arriving in the camp and being appointed ‘Third Secretary’ in the middle of 1965. He maintains that 
this meeting is the only one at Kongwa involving the top SWAPO leadership while he lived in the camp and indicates that he 
wrote the minutes by hand and then gave them to Sam Nujoma’s personal secretary, Ewald Katjivena, who probably typed them 
(Interview with Helao Shityuwete, 5 June 2008). 
150 Minutes 21/9/65, 5-6.
81Living in Exile: Daily Life and International Relations at SWAPO’s Kongwa Camp
 By September 1965, many of the Caprivians at Kongwa had gone ‘on strike’ 
by disobeying the commanders and disregarding organized camp activities.151 On 
21 September high-ranking SWAPO leaders, including President Sam Nujoma, 
gathered at Kongwa to speak with the camp commanders about ‘the problem of the 
Caprivians’.152 As the meeting minutes demonstrate, ‘the problem’ posed SWAPO 
officials with several dilemmas. Although Major Shongambele had offered to 
deport the Caprivians on the premise that they were only allowed to remain in 
Tanzania if they cooperated with SWAPO, a recognized liberation movement,153 
deportation was fraught with risks. It could poison SWAPO’s reputation in the 
Caprivi Region and result in deportees revealing information about Kongwa and 
other military secrets to ‘the Boers’.154 On the other hand, if SWAPO officials 
tried to enlist the support of Caprivians who were by then representing SWAPO 
in its offices abroad, there was no guarantee that they would cooperate or that 
the Caprivians at Kongwa would listen to them. This mistrust of the Caprivians 
manifested itself at the meeting when Mishake Muyongo, who was in attendance 
but remained outside the office while the Ovambo commanders discussed ‘the 
problem of the Caprivians’, was asked to enter and profess his loyalty to SWAPO. 
Although Muyongo claimed that he would inform his fellow Caprivians ‘to obey all 
orders given ... by SWAPO officials or the Tanzanian Government’, some SWAPO 
officials maintained that Muyongo’s words were disingenuous and that he had 
ulterior motives. As Nujoma and others alleged, Muyongo had used SWAPO’s 
Lusaka office to distribute letters to the OAU Liberation Committee, the Zambian 
government and UNIP complaining about how the SWAPO leadership was treating 
Caprivians.155 Moreover, neither Muyongo nor the other Caprivians at the camp 
were forthcoming about the location of George Mutwah and Nalishua Tongo, the 
supposed ringleaders of the strike, who had disappeared from the camp sometime 
before the meeting. Some speculated that Muyongo had only traveled to Tanzania 
for the meeting so that he could meet secretly with Mutwah and Tongo and plan 
CANU’s next move.156 
 Despite these dilemmas, SWAPO’s international recognition and the 
instruments which this recognition gave the liberation movement to control 
Namibians at Kongwa granted SWAPO officials considerable power over the 
CANU dissidents in its camp. Whereas CANU was not officially recognized by the 
organizations to which Mishake Muyongo wrote, SWAPO was recognized by all 
of them and by the Tanzanian government as well. And SWAPO drew from these 
support networks and the instruments which they allowed SWAPO to exercise at 
Kongwa to ‘resolve’ the CANU issue. 
151 Ibid., 5, 8. The camp minutes and other sources refer uniformly to the strike of ‘the Caprivians’, but some of the Caprivians 
at Kongwa did not participate in it. As Frederick Matongo emphasizes, after the meeting with Muyongo, he and some other 
Caprivians who attended actually reported the meeting’s content to the Tanzanian authorities and never went on strike (Interview 
with Matongo, 18 June 2011).
152 Minutes 21/9/65, 1. Interestingly, Shityuwete points to another conflict within the camp which he believes was the main purpose 
of Nujoma’s visit. See the section of this paper titled ‘Castro’ below.
153 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 13-14, 23; 14 December 2010.
154 Minutes 21/9/65, 2-3.
155 Minutes, 21/9/65, 7; Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010.
156 Minutes 21/9/65, 7-9.
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 Sometime after the camp meeting George Mutwah and Nalishua Tongo were 
arrested by Tanzanian officials in Dar es Salaam and detained at Keko Prison.157 At 
roughly the same time, Caprivians who remained committed to the strike refused to 
eat and moved their tents outside the physical space of the camp.158 In turn, SWAPO 
officials used their control over camp resources to coax those on the outside to 
return inside, allegedly promising them food and protection from the more ‘radical’ 
Caprivians159 while threatening those who refused to cooperate with sjamboks.160 
Within a few weeks, most or all the Caprivians living outside the camp had returned 
inside with their tents. As for Mishake Muyongo, he returned to Zambia where he 
continued to represent SWAPO at the Lusaka Office.
 Despite the outward appearance of a resolution, some Namibians who lived 
at Kongwa during the late 1960s maintain that the CANU issue in the camp was 
never resolved. According to Samson Ndeikwila, an ethnic Ovambo who arrived 
at Kongwa in 1967, the Caprivians he came to know while living at the camp felt 
that they were unwelcome within SWAPO and that their group leaders had been 
imprisoned unjustly.161 Certainly, their barracks were set up in a different section 
of the camp and they tended to socialize separately from the other Namibians.162 
Thus, when Ndeikwila and the other ‘Comrades’ who arrived in 1968 wrote their 
memorandum, they drew attention to ‘evidence of tribalism’ at Kongwa and the fates 
of George Mutwah and Nalishua Tongo – before the Comrades too were arrested. 
‘Castro’
 
On 21 September 21 1965, the date when SWAPO officials met at Kongwa, ‘the 
problem of the Caprivians’ was not the only issue on their agenda. Although the 
camp minutes report exclusively on the Caprivi conflict, the author of those minutes, 
Helao Shityuwete, maintains that there was another issue in the camp which had 
compelled the leaders to travel from Dar es Salaam. At the centre of this issue was 
the then Second-in-Command of SWALA and senior camp commander, Leonard 
Philemon ‘Castro’ Nangolo.163 
 A member of the group which established SWAPO’s forerunner in Cape Town 
during the late 1950s,164 Castro travelled to Tanzania in 1962 and from there was sent 
by SWAPO to Egypt to receive training as one of the first seven SWALA guerrillas. 
After finishing another training course in the Soviet Union, Castro returned to 
Tanzania to found the SWAPO camp at Kongwa.165 For those Namibians who 
were not satisfied with their lives at Kongwa, Castro soon became a focal point of 
157 Interviews with Hangula, 18 June 2011; Nashilongo, 11 December 2010. Hangula and Nashilongo were also detained at Keko and 
offer perspectives on Mutwah and Tongo’s arrest based, allegedly, on conversations that they had while they were all imprisoned 
together. According to Hangula, Mutwah and Tongo escaped from Kongwa and travelled to the SWAPO office in Dar es Salaam 
to present their grievances – only to be arrested when the SWAPO leaders who received them there called on the Tanzanian 
police for assistance. Testimony in the camp minutes appears to corroborate Hangula’s point (Minutes 21/9/65, 7).
158 Inhabitants at Kongwa in 1965 often refer to the Caprivians’ strike as a ‘hunger strike’, but Shityuwete maintains that the 
Caprivians did not refuse to eat until after the September 21 meeting (Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010).
159 Interview with Shityuwete, 14 December 2010.
160 Interview with Hangula, 18 June 2011. 
161 Interviews with Ndeikwila, 2 September 2007, 5; 2 March 2007, 19, 21.
162 Interviews with Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 5; Shikongo, 26 July 2007, 20; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 13.
163 Interviews with Shityuwete, 5 June 2008; 14 December 2010.
164 The name of this forerunner was the Ovamboland People’s Congress before becoming the Ovamboland People’s Organization 
(OPO) in 1959 and, finally, SWAPO in 1960. 
165 Leonard Philemon ‘Castro’ Nangolo, ‘My History’,1994 (a gift to the author); Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, 158-159; Interview 
with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 24.
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criticism, blamed for abusing the power which he wielded over Namibians living 
in the camp. For example, Castro was associated with a regime of discipline and 
deference to authority in the camp which treated camp inhabitants like ‘permanent 
soldiers’ rather than as ‘comrades’ in a liberation struggle.166 Castro set the rules 
when camp inhabitants were required to be inside the camp and report to the parade 
and yet he often absconded from the parade and spent nights in the location, where 
some believed he was sleeping with local women.167 Castro was also blamed for 
some commanders’ practice of diverting aid to the camp and selling it to the people 
living around Kongwa for self-enrichment.168 Moreover, Castro was among the camp 
commanders who did not speak English and whom some Caprivians at Kongwa saw 
as antagonistic towards them.  
 Sources suggest that some Namibians at Kongwa were dissatisfied with Castro 
from the camp’s early days and that rank-file guerrillas had tried to raise their 
concerns with Major Shongambele at a camp meeting before September 1965.169 
The September 1965 meeting, however, reflected a significant, new conjuncture of 
events. In May of that year, three new groups of guerrillas returned from military 
training in Algeria, Egypt and Ghana to Kongwa. Upon their return, the leaders of 
these groups, including Dimo Hamaambo, Caleb Tjipahura and Helao Shityuwete,170 
became responsible for training newcomers to the camp and, in the process, began 
challenging the status quo. New activities were organized, attendance at the parade 
was carefully recorded, and soldiers were encouraged to drop salutes and other 
formal practices which reinforced the hierarchy within the camp.171 In response, 
Castro contacted the SWAPO head office in Dar es Salaam and a meeting was 
scheduled with SWAPO leaders which would address the tension between the camp 
commanders as well as the Caprivi issue.172 According to Helao Shityuwete, President 
Nujoma opened the meeting by asking Castro to speak about the problems at the 
camp and with Castro insinuating that the newcomers were instigating the rank-in-
file ‘to rebel against [Castro] and his other commanders’. In response, Hamaambo, 
Tjipahura and Shityuwete explained their dissatisfaction with the conditions they 
found at the camp – points that were strengthened, apparently, when Peter Hambiya, 
the SWAPO Secretary based in Dar es Salaam, checked the camp books against his 
own, discovering that there were items intended for Kongwa inhabitants which had 
not been registered in the books. Thereafter, Hamaambo, Tjipahura and Shityuwete 
were each appointed to formal positions in the camp command alongside Castro, 
who retained the position of senior camp commander.173  
 The September 1965 meeting may have temporarily addressed the Castro issue 
at Kongwa, but it soon emerged again – albeit in an expanded context. In February 
1966 Castro was selected as a member of Group 2 (G2), the second group of SWALA 
166 Interviews with Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 23; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 2, 5; Never Follow the Wolf, 99.
167 Interviews with Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 10; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 3; 14 December 2010; Helao Shityuwete, Never Follow the 
Wolf, 99.
168 Interviews with Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 23, 28-29; Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 3, 4, 10; Helao Shityuwete, Never Follow the Wolf, 99.
169 Interview with Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 23-24, 27-28, 28-29.
170 Interview Dimo Hamaambo was the leader of the group trained in Algeria and went on to become the Commander of the 
People’s Liberation Army of Namibia, the successor to SWALA.
171 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 2; Ashipala, 25 July 2007, 27-28.
172 Shityuwete maintains that the main issue on the agenda for the meeting was, in fact, the disagreement between the commanders 
and that the commanders themselves might have resolved the Caprivi issue on their own, with the help of the Tanzanian 
government, if Castro had not contacted the head office to draw attention to the conflict between the commanders (Interview 
with Shityuwete, 5 June 2008).
173 Interviews with Shityuwete, 24 July 2007, 3-4; 5 June 2008.
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guerrillas which departed from Kongwa to infiltrate Namibia. Three months later, 
Castro’s group was arrested by the South African Police in Namibia’s Kavango Region 
as were the members of several subsequent groups which travelled from Kongwa to 
Namibia.174 As Kongwa inhabitants learned about these arrests, rumours spread that 
they were being led unwittingly to their capture through the work of a South African 
agent or agents. Suspicions focused on Castro, who had somehow managed to return 
to Tanzania after the G2 group was captured and had been involved in planning the 
movements of the subsequent groups which had travelled from Kongwa to Namibia. 
Although Castro maintained that he escaped his captors after his arrest, others 
suspected that he had negotiated his release and was responsible for the capture of 
guerrillas and for other major setbacks which SWAPO experienced in late 1966 and 
1967.175 A turning point in Kongwa inhabitants’ perception of Castro appears to 
have been a meeting at the SWAPO parade in 1967 when members of SWAPO and 
the ANC gathered to hear Castro speak about Omgulumbashe and SWAPO’s other 
military operations inside Namibia. According to one source, guerrillas questioned 
the truthfulness of Castro’s story because, when he delivered it, he omitted important 
details and was ‘shivering’ as if he were panicked to speak on this topic.176 
 Thus, by the time the Seven Comrades entered Kongwa in 1968, rumours were 
circulating that Castro was a spy and the Comrades’ memorandum discusses Castro 
exclusively in relation to these rumours. In so doing, however, it and other literature 
on ‘the Kongwa Crisis’ overlook the more mundane aspects of camp life which were 
initially the focus of criticisms of Castro and which enabled him to wield power over 
Namibians in similar ways across the 1960s. By controlling the camp’s boundaries 
and breaking his own rules, by siphoning aid from foreign donors, and, perhaps, by 
becoming a double agent for South Africa, Castro abused his privileged access to the 
international community supporting Kongwa camp. When rank-in-file Namibians 
tried to initiate a discussion about Castro beyond the camp, they were faced with 
their own marginal status in this community. Although the Seven Comrades 
requested an audience with their leaders in Dar es Salaam, when they presented 
their memorandum to SWAPO commanders and Tanzanian officials at Kongwa, 
the Tanzanian police drove them directly to the Dar es Salaam Police Station, where 
they were detained for six months before being sent to Keko for an additional nine 
months of imprisonment.177 In early 1969 Castro himself was imprisoned at Keko, 
where he remained for the next seventeen years, leading some former exiles to 
speculate that the Comrades’ memorandum prompted an investigation, proving 
Castro’s spying activities.178 Nevertheless, for Namibians then living at Kongwa, 
the Castro issue remained unresolved since the reasons for Castro’s arrest, the 
information which he revealed to the South African government, and the people 
who assisted him in his work were still unclear. Apparently, rumours about Castro 
and his collaboration with other SWAPO leaders were a central issue in 1971, when a 
174 For information about G2, see the accounts of G2 member Helao Shityuwete (Never Follow the Wolf, 101-130) and Sam Nujoma 
(Where Others Wavered, 170-171). The arrest of subsequent groups is confirmed by former Kongwa inhabitants interviewed and 
by Nujoma (Where Others Wavered, 172-173).
175 Among the events widely attributed to Castro are the arrest of OPC/OPO founder Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo in 1966, Ya Toivo’s 
later imprisonment on Robben Island, and the death of SWALA Commander Tobias Hainyeko who was killed in a shoot out 
along the Zambezi River outside Katima Mulilo on 18 May 18 1967.
176 Interviews with Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 3; 21 July 2007, 34, 35.
177 Interviews with Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007, 3-4; 21 July 2007, 41-42; 17 June 2011; Kati, 11 August 2007, 5-6; 16 June 2011. After 
their release from Keko, the Seven Comrades were sent to a refugee settlement in rural northern Tanzania known as Ndebaro 
from where they escaped in early 1970 and made their way to Kenya.
178 Interviews with Kati, 11 August 2007, 9; Ndeikwila, 9 February 2007; Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 20-24.
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riot broke out in the SWAPO camp and all the Namibians there were removed from 
the site.179 Only in 1974, when a new generation with no prior experience of Castro 
or of Kongwa joined SWAPO in exile, did the liberation movement re-open its 
Kongwa camp. 
Conclusion
As these histories suggest, Kongwa is a significant site for studying the formation 
of Namibia. There, at the first camp granted to SWAPO to build a united liberation 
army, tensions emerged which divided inhabitants and precipitated multiple 
defections and imprisonments. Although these tensions at Kongwa were eventually 
‘resolved’, similar issues have repeatedly surfaced among Namibians, sometimes 
with dramatic consequences. For example, in 1976, following ‘the exodus’ of a new 
generation of Namibians into Zambia, the liberation movement detained more 
than a thousand SWAPO guerrillas and eleven leaders who had openly criticized 
some of the SWAPO leadership and called for a Party Congress. During the mid- 
and late 1980s, members of SWAPO’s security apparatus exploited conditions 
in Angola – including class and regional tensions and suspicions of spies within 
the liberation movement – to imprison and eliminate Namibians whom they 
mistrusted.180And in 1999, nearly a decade after Namibia’s independence, a Caprivi 
secessionist movement, led by Mishake Muyongo, launched an attack on Katima 
Mulilo, resulting in the arrest of more than a hundred accused secessionists and a 
state treason trial which remains on-going. Across these years, the same organization 
and many of the same individuals who were responsible for governing Namibians 
at Kongwa have governed the Namibian nation, addressing and shaping conflicts 
among its members. And Namibian citizens have invoked ‘the Kongwa Crisis’, 
viewing it as a point of origin for later conflicts and using it to discredit or defend 
Namibia’s liberation movement, now ruling party.
 Despite the significance of histories of Kongwa for Namibia, however, Kongwa 
was more than a Namibian event. It was a place where Namibians were shaped by 
the international community which surrounded and constituted them there. To 
see this place primarily within a broader history of SWAPO or another national 
liberation movement is to lose sight of the boundaries set between nations at places 
like Kongwa and the stakes in how different people were able to cross them. As 
emphasized above, the ability of Namibians to access the recognition of international 
organizations, the aid of foreign donors and the attention of Tanzanian women at 
Kongwa were highly unequal. Through their privileged access to such resources 
outside the camp, the commanders and the political leaders who supported them 
wielded considerable power over those living inside, even as the abuse of this power 
generated strikes, critical memoranda and other initiatives aimed at challenging 
camp officials’ authority. These social relations, inherent to the structure of camp 
life, are overlooked in the previous Namibian literature on Kongwa which focuses on 
179 Although this riot is not mentioned in previous historiography, it is discussed at some length in my dissertation ‘Exile History’, 
230-231, 233-234. See also Interview with Nepelilo, 4 August 2007, 25-26, 29-30.
180 I discuss these developments within SWAPO in exile and the politics of their representation in Namibia in my doctoral 
dissertation (‘Exile History’) as well as in two articles: ‘Ordering the Nation: SWAPO in Zambia, 1974-1976’, The Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 37, 4 (2011), 693-713 and ‘“The Spy” and the Camp: SWAPO Camps in Lubango, Angola, 1980-1989’, 
in Wayne Dooling, Hilary Sapire and Christopher Saunders, eds., The Struggle for Southern Africa: New Local and International 
Perspectives (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2012). 
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events like ‘the Crisis’ or a few people like Castro rather than on the social context in 
which an international community at Kongwa lived. And they have shaped the way 
in which Kongwa’s history has been told – as a story about the ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’ 
of a particular national struggle rather than about a community living at a camp in 
rural, central Tanzania during the early days of southern Africa’s guerrilla armies and 
at the height of the Cold War. 
 Camps have a unique potential to elucidate social contexts which have shaped 
southern Africa’s past and present. Although frequently reduced to events and 
people in a national narrative, camps may disrupt the circuits of national knowledge 
production when their study draws attention to the sites where exiles lived. To 
this end, scholars of southern Africa have the opportunity to draw from a growing 
literature on ‘the camp’, highlighting the highly unequal power relations and national 
subjectivities which have repeatedly formed in this kind of social space across 
contexts.181 At the same time, southern African studies may make a significant 
contribution to camp literature. For the places where exiles from the region lived 
were not mere reproductions of ‘the camp’. They were sites shaped by particular 
histories, some of which are shared by southern Africa as a region and others of 
which are unique to the specific camps concerned. Such histories may be lost in 
the existing literature which tends to render ‘the camp’ an abstract, apolitical space. 
But they are precisely the histories to which scholars of southern Africa’s recent past 
should be attentive – if we look beyond the dominant representations of exile, with 
their uncritical acceptance of the nation as the object of history, and examine the 
lived spaces in which the region’s national communities formed abroad. 
 Kongwa is one such lived space with special significance for southern Africa and 
for the study of its liberation movements’ camps. As the first site granted to southern 
Africa’s OAU recognized liberation movements to govern their fellow nationals 
abroad, Kongwa is likely to have been formative not only for SWAPO and the 
communities it administered in exile, but also for many of the region’s movements. 
At the same time, Kongwa hosted an entirely unique collection of camps, shaped 
by contexts which differed from the far-flung sites in which exiles lived across the 
front-line states during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Both perspectives on Kongwa 
are obscured by national historiographies, and yet, as I suggest here, both are critical 
to examining camps and their legacies for southern Africa. 
181 Formative and widely cited texts in this literature include: Hannah Arendt, ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the 
Rights of Man’ in The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1951), 267-302; Liisa Malkki, Purity 
and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995); Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
